

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

In the matter of the Nevada Republican Party Request for Investigation of Early Voting Issues in Washoe and Clark Counties – November 2, 2010 General Election

By: Carolyn Ellsworth, Esq. Securities Administrator Office of the Secretary of State

Dated this 29th day of October, 2010.

Introduction:

On October 25, 2010, the Election Division of the Office of the Secretary of State received, via hand delivery, a letter from the O'Mara Law Firm, PC, on behalf of its client, the Nevada Republican Party (NRP). Said letter consists of forty-four (44) pages including attachments, and indicates that the NRP had concerns regarding the early voting process. These concerns were based upon NRP's review of certain documents obtained from Washoe and Clark Counties' respective Voter Registrars.

Specifically, NRP had reviewed election board statements filed pursuant to NRS 293.3604. These statements are entitled "Polling Place Statement" in Clark County and "Early Voting Daily Balance Statement" in Washoe County. NRP, through its counsel, made several requests to the Secretary of State, including a request for investigation and a request that the form of the Clark County election board statements be changed. For organizational and clarity purposes, each of the requests and concerns will be addressed separately below. However, since all of NRP's concerns center around the early voting election board statements, a good starting place is the requirements of NRS 293.3604.

NRS 293.3604 provides:

NRS 293.3604 Mechanical recording devices: Duties of election board at close of each voting day; duties of ballot board for early voting and county clerk at close of last voting day. If ballots which are voted on a mechanical recording device which directly records the votes

electronically are used during the period for early voting by personal appearance in an election other than a presidential preference primary election:

- 1. At the close of each voting day, the election board shall:
- (a) Prepare and sign a statement for the polling place. The statement must include:
 - (1) The title of the election;
 - (2) The number of the precinct or voting district;
- (3) The number which identifies the mechanical recording device and the storage device required pursuant to NRS 293B.084;
 - (4) The number of ballots voted on the mechanical recording device for that day; and
 - (5) The number of signatures in the roster for early voting for that day.
 - (b) Secure:
 - (1) The ballots pursuant to the plan for security required by NRS 293.3594; and
- (2) Each mechanical voting device in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.3594.
- 2. At the close of the last voting day, the county clerk shall deliver to the ballot board for early voting:
 - (a) The statements for all polling places for early voting;
 - (b) The voting rosters used for early voting;
- (c) The storage device required pursuant to <u>NRS 293B.084</u> from each mechanical recording device used during the period for early voting; and
 - (d) Any other items as determined by the county clerk.
- 3. Upon receipt of the items set forth in subsection 2 at the close of the last voting day, the ballot board for early voting shall:
 - (a) Sort the items by precinct or voting district;
 - (b) Count the number of ballots voted by precinct or voting district;
 - (c) Account for all ballots on an official statement of ballots; and

(d) Place the items in the container provided to transport those items to the central counting place and seal the container with a numbered seal. The official statement of ballots must accompany the items to the central counting place.

NRS 293.217 provides that the county clerk of each county shall appoint registered voters to act as election board officers for the various precincts and districts in the county. The election board officers are commonly referred to as the "poll workers" at the particular polling place. In Clark and Washoe Counties, qualified registered voters can volunteer to serve as poll workers, and the recruitment of poll workers is continual. Poll workers must attend and pass training classes concerning their duties, responsibilities and the procedures for carrying out those duties. Poll workers are minimally paid volunteers who have the ability to work long hours (on election day about 14 hours) and, if they are early voting poll workers, to work long hours for up to two weeks straight.

The statements required by NRS 293.3604 are, in Washoe and Clark Counties, prepared on forms designed by the respective registrar. It is important to note that the statute does not require a particular form for the statement, but rather spells out the information which must be contained therein. I interviewed Harvard L. Lomax, the registrar for Clark County, and Daniel G. Burk, the registrar for Washoe County to obtain preliminary information necessary for my investigation.

EARLY VOTING PROCEDURE IN CLARK COUNTY

The polls are not closed during the early voting period. They are considered open for the entire 14 day early voting period. During early voting what happens is that each night when the early voting site shuts down, the number of

ballots on the machine is recorded by the poll workers, the machine is powered down and the data cartridge is removed by the poll workers who place the cartridge in a box and seal it with special seals for that purpose. Then, either the boxes are driven to the central elections department building by the workers or County election department workers pick the boxes up and drive them to the central elections department building. The information on the cartridges is downloaded to the computer so that the daily voting numbers can be released to the public on the County's election department website. The cartridges are locked in a vault at the central elections department building overnight and taken to the polling places the next morning in the same fashion. (i.e. either picked up by the poll workers or driven to the polling place by the county election department employees.) In the morning, after the cartridge is inserted back into the machine the poll worker verifies that the number of ballots recorded from the night before is the same as what it is showing in the morning. At the end of that voting day, the poll workers record the number of ballots on each machine and record those, together with the total for all machines, on the Polling Place Statement, and they manually count the number of signatures on the registered voter signature sheets and record it on the Polling Place Statement for that day. The statements are sent with the sealed cartridges to the central election department building.

Two reconciliations take place. The first takes place at the polling place where the workers count up the number of signatures on their voter registration signature sheets and compare that total with the total number of ballots recorded on the voting machines at the site. If there is a discrepancy, it is evident on the

statement and the workers are to note it on a discrepancy log. The second reconciliation is between the downloaded daily count on the machines and the data entered in the voter registration system at the poling place. This reconciliation process takes place at the Registrar's office and begins each night after early voting ends each day. The Registrar's "audit team," made up of Mr. Lomax and a small number of his employees, attempt to determine the source of any discrepancies found during the reconciliations.

EARLY VOTING PROCEDURES IN WASHOE COUNTY

Washoe County's procedures differ from those of Clark in that Washoe does not download the information from the voting machine cartridges each day.

Rather, the cartridges are removed from the machines sealed, and locked in a vault at each of the early voting sites. The poll workers at the sites also fill out daily statements (the form is slightly different from that of Clark County) which record the total number of ballots on each voting machine, and the total number of signatures on the voter registration roster sheets. Washoe County also has a live computerized registration system into which the poll workers input data as each voter checks in to vote. The daily statements filled out by the poll workers are picked up by the Registrar's office employees at each of the voting sites the next morning when the supplies for that new day's voting are delivered to the site. The statements are taken to the Registrar's office where they are placed into a basket on the desk of Luanne Cutler, Administrative Secretary to the Registrar. Ms. Cutler double checks the math of the poll workers and if there is any error, she notes that

on a separate tracking sheet which is attached to the statement. The total number of ballots on the machines, as recorded on the statements, is reconciled with the data entered into the voter registration system at the polls. Like Clark County, the Washoe County Registrar attempts to determine the source of any discrepancies.

ISSUE #1: Change in the form of the Clark County statement required by NRS 293.3604

The letter from NRP's counsel indicates that on the third day of early voting for the 2010 general election, the form of Clark County's daily "Polling Place Statement" was changed from a form which required the poll workers to hand write the total number of ballots showing on each voting machine in the morning prior to voting commencing, to a form which includes, pre-printed on the form, the number of ballots recorded at the close of voting the previous night, and requires that the worker compare the pre-printed number on form with the number on the machine and then check a box to verify that the number is the same. NRP believes that the change to the form "precludes the Registrar's office – or the public- from being able to independently verify those figures." Moreover, the NRP alleges that the revised form is "obviously less secure than requiring the poll watchers [sic] to record data from the voting machines without giving them the answers in advance." Examples of the original version of the form, as well as the revised versions of the form were attached to the NRP letter.

I interviewed Assistant Registrar Donna Cardinelli, regarding the history surrounding the creation of the NRS 293.3604 statement forms. Ms. Cardinelli

explained that the original form was a three part carbon-copy form. Columns 3 (Machine serial #) and 5 (Beginning number of votes) of that form had gray shading overlaying them. When representatives of the various political parties began requesting copies of the forms, and the forms were scanned so that they could be transmitted in electronic format, the gray shaded columns appeared black on the scanned copy. The entries in those columns were illegible. Thus, a new form was designed that could be scanned and still remain legible. When the new form was designed, it was decided that the beginning number of ballots on each machine would be self-populated into the form from the cartridge data download of that number. This would save the poll workers the trouble of re-recording by hand, the numbers that they had already recorded at the end of each day. Since the prior day's form could be compared against the next day's form, there was a sufficient audit trail. (i.e. The prior day's end of day handwritten totals can be compared against the next day's form.) The NRP's assertion that the change to the firm precludes the public from being able to independently verify the numbers is therefore without merit.

The methodology for determining the number of ballots voted each day for recordation upon the statement required by NRS 293.3604 is to record the total vote number on the machine at the end of the day and from that number, subtract the number of ending votes from the day before (which is the same number as the number at the start of the next day). The law only requires that the statement reflect the number of ballots voted each day. It does not require that the statement show the method of getting that number. But, for the sake of transparency, the

Registrar designed the form to show the backup for how the number was reached. Thus, there are columns which show the beginning number of voted ballots on each machine, the ending number on each machine, and then the difference between the two numbers – the total number of ballots recorded on the machine for the day. The totals for each machine are added and there is a place on the form for the total ballots cast on all machines for the day. The methodology is not changed by filling in the prior days total ballot number so that the poll workers don't have to manually record the number again each morning. They recorded the numbers by hand the night before and the data is confirmed by downloading from the cartridges the night before after the cartridges are delivered to the central election building vault. The filled in numbers are generated from that source and filled in automatically by the computer from the electronic data. After the new form was designed, the poll workers were trained to examine the machine, verify that the reading on the machine matches the self-populated beginning number on the form, and check a box indicating that they had made the verification. While copies of the old form are illegible (i.e. the identifying numbers for each machine are illegible and column 5, showing the running total at the end of the day, is also illegible.) in the new form, all the information is legible and the math of the poll workers can be double checked by members of the public who request access to these public documents. Thus, the new form appears to be superior to the old form.

ISSUE #1: Failure of the poll workers to check some or all of the verification boxes on the newly designed form.

The letter from the NRP's counsel attached copies of five (5) Clark County Polling Place Statements where the poll workers had failed to check the box indicating that they had verified that the read on the machine prior to voting beginning the next voting day, matched the number on the form that had been selfpopulated and printed on the form by the Registrar's office. The letter further called for an "investigation of any voting machines for which the Polling Place Statements fail to establish that the Beginning Count was verified...." As explained above, the ending numbers on the statements from the day before can be compared to the beginning numbers on the next days forms. Additionally, my interview of the Assistant Registrar who inspects the daily statements and meets with the team leaders after each days early voting, revealed that the failure in a few instances to check all or some of the verification boxes was merely an oversight by poll workers. These forms are already in the possession of the NRP as they were requested and provided by the Registrar. As a full audit trail is available, further investigation would serve no purpose.

ISSUE #2: Discrepancies between the total number of ballots voted as recorded on the voting machines, with the total number of signatures on the registered voter roster.

The letter from the NRP's counsel attached seven (7) copies of NRS 293.3604 statements. Five (5) of these statements were from Clark County and two were from Washoe County. The letter characterized discrepancies between the total number of ballots voted as recorded on the voting machines and the total number of

signatures on the registered voter roster as evidencing "'extra' votes [being] recorded on [the] voting machines. While such a conclusion does evidence faulty logic, the notation of a discrepancy does not prove counsel's conclusion.

Attachment 8:

I examined the Polling Place Statement for October 17, 2010 at the Pearson early voting site in Clark County. The statement shows that the total number of signatures on the early voting roster was 219. The statement also shows that the total number of ballots shown on the machines at the site that day was 220. I examined the daily summary of early voting totals on the Clark County Registrar's web-site. That summary shows that the total number of voters at the Pearson site was 220. I then downloaded, from the Registrar's web-site, the detail information which lists the names and other information of every voter who early voted on a particular day. The web-site contains a caution which reads:

<u>Please Note</u>: The information in the daily files has not yet been audited. During auditing, we may occasionally find and correct a clerical error. An audited cumulative turnout file for the election will be posted to clarify these errors.

This data is taken from the computerized check-in information which is input at the voting site by the poll workers when the voter checks in to vote. Since the data entry for each voter included the site where that person voted, I was able to sort by voting site and then determine the number of entries (1 per voter) for the Pearson site on 10/17/10. The total number showed 221, a difference of one more than showed on the voting machine count as reflected in the Polling Place Statement and

as shown in the daily summary on the Registrar's web-site. I then downloaded the audited cumulative turnout file and sorted by voting site and date in order to determine whether the number still showed 221. In fact, the audited cumulative report showed 220 early voters on 10/17/10 at the Pearson site. I then compared the data in the 10/17/10 early voting file with the data in the cumulative file and found that voter Earlene Kay Smith, ID#1210908, whose name had appeared on the daily un-audited report, was not on the audited cumulative report as having voted on 10/17/10. Rather, the cumulative report showed that she voted on 10/26/10 at the Centennial Center site. This would tend to indicate that the voting machine count of 220 was accurate, that an improper entry into the computerized registration data base had been made by the poll worker at the Pearson site and caught during the audit process so that the voter could vote. I obtained Ms. Smith's telephone number from the downloadable active registered voter database on the Registrar's website and on October 28, 2010, left her a detailed message identifying myself and asking that she return my call to verify that she had voted at the Centennial Center site. As of this writing, approximately four hours since the message was left, she has not returned my call.

Attachment 11:

I examined a copy of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement from the Scolari's 20 early voting site, dated October 19, 2010. I again asked that Criminal Investigator David Evans travel to the voting site in Reno to interview the poll worker who had signed the statement. Investigator Evans traveled to 8165 S.

Virginia Street in Reno and met with Ms. Betty Jo Vonderheide who identified herself as the team leader poll worker of the site. Ms. Vonderheide stated that they have seven (7) voting machines at her early voting site, and that they are the second busiest polling location in Washoe County. Investigator Evans showed her a copy of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement for October 19, 2010 and she identified the signature upon the statement as hers. Ms. Vonderheide stated that she filled out the Early Voting Daily Balance Sheet with all of the information and signed on the bottom left of the page above "Signature-Team Leader." She further stated that she recorded the total ballots cast on each of the voting machines and totaled all of the signatures on the roster sheets for this day. Ms. Vonderheide explained that the total number of ballots cast and total number of signatures on the roster sheets were verified by Ken Harrison, but that he did not sign the early voting daily balance statement. Ms. Vonderheide stated that she cannot account for the discrepancy between the total number of ballots cast on all voting machines (458), and the total number of signatures on roster sheets (457). She further stated that she remembered making the correction on the statement in the total number signatures on the roster sheets column (457) and that she should have initialed her change, but she was simply correcting her own handwriting mistake.

Attachment 12:

I examined the copies of the statements attached to counsel's letter and noted that attachment number 12, the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement of October 19, 2010 from Washoe County early voting site, South Valleys Library, had a

discrepancy of one (1) ballot/voter. The statement indicated that there had been one more ballot recorded on the machines than the number of voters who had signed in to vote. I also noted that the bottom of the statement contained handwritten notes which appeared to read "Mark Seeley 2 cast votes." I dispatched Criminal Investigator David Evan from the Reno office of the Secretary of State to travel to the South Valleys Library location with a copy of the aforementioned statement, and I instructed him to meet with the poll workers who had signed the statement and interview them as to the circumstances surrounding the information set forth on the subject statement. Investigator Evans met with Richard Jones who identified himself as the team leader poll worker of the South Valleys Library early voting site. Mr. Jones identified his signature on the bottom left of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement and indicated that he had filled our all of the information on the statement. Mr. Jones stated that he took the readings of the numbers of ballots from each of the twelve (12) machines at his site and he counted and totaled the number of signatures on the roster sheets for that day. These numbers were verified by June Wisniewski who signed on the lower bottom right of statement.

Mr. Jones explained the voting process to Investigator Evans as follows: When a person comes into vote, he or she must either produce their sample ballot or a valid identification card. If a sample ballot is given, the bar code on the sample ballot is scanned into the laptop, which will then bring up the voter information, at which time the intake person is to verify the person's ID with the screen information. If no sample ballot is given, but rather an identification card,

the intake person will then type the voter's name into the system and look them up that way. Once the intake person has located the voter in the system, the system's message is "use that voter." Once this message is clicked, the system sends the voter information to the activator, a separate system connected to the computer that produces the voter card. Before a voter is allowed to vote, they must sign a voter roster sheet.

Mr. Jones explained to Investigator Evans that on October 19, 2010, a Mr. Mark Seeley came in to vote. Mr. Seeley was verified in the computerized system and given a card to vote, which Mr. Seeley used to vote before leaving the polling site. After Mr. Seeley voted, another unknown voter came in. According to Mr. Jones, Mr. Seeley's information was still on the intake person's screen, which is normal. However, the intake person did not update the screen with the new voter information. Mr. Jones stated that with Mr. Seeley's information still on the screen, the intake person then clicked "use that voter". Mr. Jones stated that the computer would have given a message warning that the selected voter may have previously voted on this date, time and location. If such a warning message displays, the prescribed procedure is for the poll worker to call the Registrar's office for further instructions. However, the intake person instead clicked "activate voter card" and the information for Mr. Seeley was sent to the Activator, and another card was printed with Mr. Seeley's information on it and given to the unknown voter who then voted with this card. Mr. Jones stated that after voting, the unknown voter commented to the intake person that his voting choices did not look correct when he voted. Mr. Jones stated it was at this time that he became

involved and realized the error made by the intake person. Mr. Jones stated that they then found this voter in the system, printed out another card for him, and allowed him to vote a second time under his correct name. Obviously, this voter should not have been allowed to cast a second ballot, but the facts do not demonstrate intentional voter fraud on the part of the poll workers or the unidentified voter who was allowed to cast two ballots.

Mr. Jones stated that the total number of votes cast on all edge voting machines (567) was one number over the total number of signatures on roster sheets (566) because 2 votes were cast under Mr. Seeley's name. Mr. Jones stated that a note was made on the bottom right hand side of the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement noting that 2 votes had been cast for Mark Seeley, ID 374123, and precinct 2035.

Due to time constraints occasioned by the desire to complete this report prior to Election Day, I did not do further investigation of the remaining four Statements as three involved only a one vote discrepancy and one involved only a two ballot discrepancy. The statement with the apparent two vote discrepancy (Attachment 13) involves provisional signatures and provisional ballots cast so that it is likely that confusion arose over this issue when filling out the statement. The Registrar's office website is reporting the total ballots cast at the questioned sites in the same numbers as shown on the poll worker statements taken from their readings of the machines and calculations made at the end of the day. I checked the math on each of these statements and found them to be correct. Since the count by the Registrar is taken from the cartridges and matches the poll workers count, the

greater likelihood is that the count of the signatures on the Roster is incorrect and was discovered during the reconciliation process described.

ISSUE #3: "Audit Boards"

The letter from counsel for NRP expresses concern that an "Audit Board" which examines voting discrepancies in Clark and Washoe County exists. This conclusion was reached after the Clark County Registrar, in apparently casual conversation with persons unidentified by counsel, was attempting to explain his office's election reconciliation process. I interviewed both registrars and each explained that any discrepancies noted in the reconciliation process were examined by the respective registrars and their employees in an attempt to discover the reasons therefore. This work is done in the normal course of conducting the election and reporting on the results of the final canvas. There are no "Audit Boards" apart from the registrars and their election department employees. The registrars are subject to and aware of the public record disclosure law in Nevada. The NRP request that the Secretary of State direct the registrars to disclose the matters they are investigating prior to public records being produced is inappropriate.

ISSUE #4: Handwritten Changes to Daily NRS 293.3604 Statements

The letter from counsel for NRP notes the existence of handwritten revisions on the Daily Statements and attaches copies of three (3) Statements which contain such revisions. Particular concern was expressed over changes to an Early Voting

Daily Balance Statement from Washoe County (Attachment 16 to the letter) which apparently contained "white-out" tape.

I dispatched Criminal Investigator David Evans to travel to the Washoe County Registrar of Voters office at 1001 E. Ninth Street in Reno. The office is also an early voting site and was where the Statement containing the "white-out" correction tape was completed.

Investigator Evans spoke with Ms. Luanne Cutler, Administrative Secretary to Registrar Burk, and with Ms. Julie Penman, a poll worker team member. While at the site, Ms. Cutler and Penman told him the following regarding the Early Voting Daily Balance Sheet dated October 16, 2010 that contained 2 pages:

Ms. Penman stated that she and Sarah Britt, who was not present but out to lunch at the time of Investigator Evans' interview, filled out the Early Voting Daily Balance Statement for October 16, 2010. Ms. Penman stated that Sara Britt calculated the numbers in only the far right column under Violet Open/Close Polls Seal (L), and that she (Penman) completed all of the other information on both pages. Ms. Cutler pulled the original form from the Registrar's files when Investigator Evans discussed the document with Ms. Penman. Evans noted that there is a noticeable difference in handwriting in the columns of the document and that this is consistent with Ms. Penman's explanation about who filled in each area of the statement.

Ms. Penman stated she and Ms. Britt both verified the total number of ballots cast and total number of signatures on the roster sheets, and that they were unable to reconcile the differences in the numbers (147) for total number of votes

cast and (148) for total signatures on roster sheets. Ms. Cutler stated that this is not common but does happen occasionally if a voter leaves after signing in and without casting their ballot. Ms. Penman verified that she used the correction tape on both pages of the document after errors had been made.

Lastly, Evans noted that the original documents showed no numbers in the boxes to the right after total number of votes cast on all voting machines, or total number of signatures on roster sheets, and that instead the poll workers had incorrectly written the numbers on the lines to the left of the boxes. The empty boxes to the right did not show any evidence of erasure or white-out.

The other two statements attached by counsel are cross-outs commonly made to correct minor mistakes and there is nothing about them that would warrant further investigation.

ISSUE #5: Exception logs

The letter from counsel for NRP asks that the Secretary of State direct the Registrars to disclose exception logs "and other similar documents." It is unclear as to whether any public records request has been made for any such documents. As stated above, the Registrars are aware of Nevada public record law, as are their respective legal counsel. Moreover, the Secretary of State does not enforce the public record disclosure law. It would be inappropriate for the Secretary of State to direct the registrars concerning records requests which have not yet been made and which the registrars are capable of processing in conformity with Nevada law.

CONCLUSION:

This investigation, commenced the day following receipt of the request for investigation from counsel for the NRP, was completed in an expeditious manner so as to enable preparation and release of this report prior to Election Day. It was felt that the extensive media attention given to claims of voter fraud called for a speedy response in order to reassure the electorate that the voting process in Nevada is secure. My investigation reveals no evidence of voting machine tampering or voter fraud. It does reveal the presence of occasional human error in the election process, which cannot be avoided as long as humans are a part of the process. No amount of procedures can prevent error if the procedures are not followed. It is my opinion, after a review of the procedures in place for poll workers, that the procedures attempt to balance the need to prevent voting fraud at the polls, with the need to assure that every qualified voter is permitted to vote, and that said balance is achieved in these procedures.

ATTACHMENT 1

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ATTACHMENT 2

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

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34411	\square	83	124	41		
34412	\square	77	115	38		
34413	\square	81	_138	57		
34414	\square	59	109	50		
34415	Ø	61	118	57		
34416 `	\square	39	107	68		
34417	\square	28	109	81		
34418	\square	79	157	78		
34419	\square	52		65		
34420		81	160	79		
34421	Ø	96	164	48		
34422		93	163	70		
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ATTACHMENT 3

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

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34225

ATTACHMENT 4

Polling Place Statement (Early Voting - Daily) November 2, 2010 General Election

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ATTACHMENT 5